Introduction
The ability to infer the mental states (beliefs, thoughts and intentions) of others in order to predict and explain their behaviour has been conceptualized as a ÔmentalizingÕ ability or Ôtheory of mindÕ (1, 2) . Frith (3) has proposed that alterations in theory of mind underlie specific symptoms of psychosis, notably delusions of persecution, delusions of reference, delusions of misidentification, third-person auditory hallucinations, some aspects of thought disorder, and negative symptoms. According to Frith, theory of mind skills in people with these experiences develop normally, but are impaired during an acute psychotic episode. Subsequent studies by Frith and coworkers have indeed found that patients with persecutory delusions, thought disorder, or negative symptoms had difficulties performing a hinting task and a false-belief task, two tasks that are sensitive to alterations in theory of mind, whereas patients who were symptom-free at the time of testing, performed normally (4, 5) . These observations suggest that mentalizing ability is a state rather than a trait variable. However, others found that the siblings of individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia performed significantly worser than the control participants on theory of mind tests (6) . These authors suggested that alterations in theory of mind in people with psychosis represent at least in part a trait rather than a state factor. However, their sample was very small and statistical resolution limited.
One way to explain findings of alterations in theory of mind in patients and their healthy relatives is to assume that alterations in theory of mind are at least in part secondary to neuropsychological deficits. Schizophrenia is associated with neuropsychological deficits (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) , and similar, although reduced, neuropsychological deficits have also been noted in relatives of patients with schizophrenia (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) . The relatives may be at risk for later development of schizophrenia or have an undiagnosed (but genetically related) schizophrenia spectrum personality disorder. Therefore, as a group, non-schizophrenic relatives will appear less impaired than those with schizophrenia, but possibly more impaired than unrelated controls Objective: It has been proposed that alterations in theory of mind underlie specific symptoms of psychosis. The present study examined whether alterations in theory of mind reflect a trait that can be detected in non-psychotic relatives of patients with schizophrenia. Method: Participants were 43 patients with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder, 41 first-degree non-psychotic relatives and 43 controls from the general population. Theory of mind was assessed using a hinting task and a false-belief task.
Results: There was a significant association between schizophrenia risk and failure on the hinting task (OR linear trend ¼ 2.01, 95% CI: (16, 20) . In children, theory of mind skills have been associated with executive functions in particular (21) (22) (23) (24) . Some authors have argued that the cognitive changes in schizophrenia are part of a generalized decline (25) , but there is evidence that alterations in theory of mind in schizophrenia cannot be explained by the effect of IQ decline alone (26, 27 ).
In the current study therefore, we wished to examine whether alterations in theory of mind reflect a trait that can be detected in the relatives of patients with schizophrenia, independent of general IQ and neuropsychological functions such as executive functions, memory, verbal fluency, speed and attention.
Material and methods

Subjects
The sample has been described in previous publications (17, 28) . Initial selection criteria for all cases were a lifetime history of a period of psychosis (at least 2 weeks) in clear consciousness, according to the research diagnostic criteria (RDC) (29) , or being a first-degree relative of a patient meeting this criterion. All patients were in remission or in partial remission, defined as not in need of hospital admission or intensive case management. Inclusion criteria for all participants were: between the ages of 18-55 years, sufficiently fluent in Dutch, and normal results for physical examination. Written informed consent, conforming to the local ethical committee guidelines, was obtained from all participants.
Patients were recruited from the catchment area Community Mental Health Centre and the outpatient clinic of the catchment area psychiatric hospital. Relatives (free of a lifetime history of psychosis) were sampled through participating patients or through associations for relatives of patients with psychotic illness. Control subjects were recruited from the general population through a random mailing procedure in the local area. None of the controls reported a history of psychosis in a first-degree relative, and no control used psychotropic medication. The present study included 43 patients with psychosis, 41 non-psychotic firstdegree relatives, and 43 healthy controls with completed measures on social cognition, derived from a larger sample of 50 patients, 51 relatives and 50 controls. The study population originated from 57 families with at least one patient with psychosis. Of the healthy relatives, there were six mothers, five fathers, 20 sisters, nine brothers and one son. Of the 57 families, 35 families contributed one case or one relative, 20 contributed at least one case and one relative, one contributed two and one contributed three relatives. Patients, relatives and controls were interviewed with the expanded version of the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS) (30) , the Positive and Negative Syndromes Scale (PANSS) (31), the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI -an instrument to measure delusional ideation in non-clinical populations) (32) , and case note and other historical material were additionally screened for symptoms listed in the Operational Criteria Checklist for Psychotic Disorder (OCCPI) (33) . Where necessary, additional information was derived from interviews with the responsible medical officer. Based on the combined information, the computerized program OPCRIT (33) yielded RDC diagnoses. There were 34 patients (79%) with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, and nine patients with a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder (21%). In addition, five relatives were diagnosed with major depression. The patients were frequency-matched with the control subjects on age, sex and educational level (eight-point scale; primary school to university degree) (34) . The mean total score of the patient group on the BPRS was 39.0 (SD ¼ 10.1) and on the PDI the mean score was 19.3 (SD ¼ 7.3). There were no significant differences between relatives and controls in mean BPRS score and PDI score ( Table 1 ). The mean age of first psychotic symptoms was 22.0 years (SD ¼ 6.0, range 14-41 years); 41 (95.3%) patients were using antipsychotic medication, three (7.0%) patients were also using lithium, 14 (32.6%) were also using benzodiazepines, eight (18.6%) were also using antidepressants and five (11.6%) were also using anticholinergic medication. Of the relatives, three (7.3%) were using benzodiazepines, and one of them was also using antidepressants. Current use of illicit drugs was assessed using section I of the Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI; version 1.1) (35) . Four patients used marihuana and one used cocaine on a weekly basis. Two relatives reported weekly use of marihuana.
Theory of mind tasks
Theory of mind was assessed by two tasks, a so-called first order false-belief task and a hinting task, translated into Dutch from Corcoran et al. and Frith (4, 5) . The false-belief task consisted of two stories that were read aloud to the subjects (see Appendix 1). After the story was read out, two questions were asked. The first question could only Theory of mind in patients and their relatives be answered with knowledge of the mental state of one of the characters (theory of mind question) and reflected that charactersÕ false belief about the situation. As a measure of comprehension, subjects were asked a second question about the reality of the situation (reality question). This question could be answered correctly without the use of mentalizing abilities. The second question also served as a measure of how well the subject had remembered the story. If the subject gave the wrong answer to the reality question then the answer to the theory of mind question for that story was ignored in order to ensure that the measure reflected a deficit in mentalizing rather than mnemonic or comprehension ability.
The hinting task was devised to test the ability of subjects to infer the real intentions behind indirect speech utterances. The original task comprised 10 short passages presenting an interaction between two characters, four of which were used in the present study (see Appendix 1) . All passages ended with one of the characters dropping an obvious hint. The subject was then asked what the character really meant when he/she said this. An appropriate response given at this stage was given a score of two and the next story was read out. If the subjects failed to give the correct response, an even more obvious hint was added to the story. The subject was then asked what the character wants the other one to do. If a correct response was given at this stage, the subject was given a score of one. If the subject failed again to give a correct response, a score of zero was given for that item.
Neuropsychological assessment
The neuropsychological assessment was directed at the following cognitive domains: attentional span, episodic memory, verbal fluency, speed and executive functions. As a measure of attentional span, the number of sequences recalled correctly on the Digit Span backwards was used (36) . Episodic memory was assessed by the Auditory Verbal Learning Task (AVLT) (37, 38) . Animal naming was used as a measure of verbal fluency (38) . As measures of speed of information processing we used the reading task of the Stroop Color-Word Test (SCWT Card 1) (39) and the number tracking task of the Concept Shifting Test (CST) (40) which is a modified version of the Trailmaking Test (41) . The Stroop Color-Word Test involves three cards displaying a hundred stimuli each: color names, colored patches, and color names printed in incongruously colored ink. To assess executive functions, we used the interference score of the SCWT, and the interference score of the CST (which is comparable with Trailmaking B). Stroop interference was expressed as the percentage of extra time needed for Card III, relative to the average of the first and second card. Similarly, the interference score of the CST was expressed as the percentage of extra time needed for the number/letter tracking, relative to the average of the number and letter version. To obtain a measure of general intelligence, we used the shortened form of a widely used Dutch Intelligence Test, the Groningen Intelligence Test (GIT) (42) . This test yields results that are comparable with those of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (36) . Three subtests have proven to yield a good approximation of fullscale IQ (42) .
Statistical analyses
Statistical analyses were performed using STATA, version 7.0 (43). Continuous outcome variables measuring theory of mind were generated for the false-belief tasks and the hinting task separately. Because these variables were extremely skewed because of the fact that the great majority of participants performed well on the tasks, the variables were dichotomized (score 0 or 1), a score of 0 indicating that the subject did not make any error on the task, a score of 1 indicating that the subject made at least one error. A three-level group variable was constructed reflecting risk for schizophrenia with controls (coded 0) at the baseline, relatives (coded 1) in the middle, and patients (coded 2) in the highest category. Logistic regression was used to assess and adjust the association between theory of mind and schizophrenia risk, expressed as the logistic regression odds ratio. The following a priori selected confounders of the association between theory of mind and schizophrenia risk were included in the logistic regression model: age, sex, level of education (low, medium, high) and IQ. In addition, we assessed the effect of controlling for neuropsychological functions (executive functions, memory, verbal fluency, speed and attention) with higher scores of these variables indicating poorer performance. In order to examine the effect of current level of symptoms on the association between schizophrenia risk and theory of mind, the analyses were adjusted for total score on the BPRS and for the score reflecting the positive psychotic symptoms. Because alterations in theory of mind in relatives may be mediated by schizotypal features, additional analyses were performed in which the association between theory of mind and schizophrenia risk were adjusted for PDI score.
Results
The mean age of the sample was 35.3 years (SD ¼ 9.8). As a group, the patients were somewhat younger than the relatives (see Table 1 ). The three groups were well matched in terms of level of education. The patient group had a significantly lower IQ compared with the relatives and the controls (see Table 1 ). One-way analyses of variance indicated significant differences between the groups on the total score of the AVLT, SCWT Card 1, CST number tracking, the Digit Span backward and verbal fluency (see Table 1 ). Some participants could not be assessed with the falsebelief task, because the task was not available at the time of testing. For the false-belief task, data were available for 34 patients (47% male), 31 relatives (42% male) and 42 controls (50% male). For these groups, mean age of the patients was 32.9 (SD 8.0), mean age of the relatives was 40.2 (SD 11.3) and mean age of the controls was 34.8 (SD 8.9). Other participant characteristics as well as neuropsychological test results were comparable with the characteristics of the whole sample. The number of people that failed on the hinting task was: 20 in the patient group (46.5%), 10 in the relatives (24.4%) and eight in the control group (18.6%). Six (17.7%) patients failed on the firstorder false-belief task, five (16.1%) relatives and three (7.1%) controls. Regardless of the effect of diagnostic group, a positive but statistically imprecise association was found between performance on the false-belief task and the hinting task (OR ¼ 1.43, 95% CI 0.45-4.56).
There was a significant association between schizophrenia risk (the three-level variable with controls coded 0, relatives coded 1 and schizophrenia coded 2) and failure on the hinting task (OR linear trend ¼ 2.01, 95% CI: 1.22-3.31) ( Adjusting the association between schizophrenia risk and performance on the hinting task for age, sex and educational level reduced the excess risk by only 2% (OR ¼ 1.99, 95% CI: 1.18-3.35), and additional adjustment for IQ reduced the association by around 6% (OR ¼ 1.95, 95% CI: 1.13-3.35 (Table 2) . Adjustment for the neuropsychological factors on top of age, sex and educational level reduced the association by <30%. Adjustment for total score on the BPRS did not change the pattern of results (see Table 2 ), nor did adjustment for the score reflecting the items on positive psychotic symptoms (OR linear trend ¼ 2.30, 95% CI: 1.26-4.20). Likewise, after adjustment for the total score on the PDI, the association between failure on the hinting task and schizophrenia risk remained significant (OR linear trend ¼ 4.03, 95% CI: 1.84-8.83).
Discussion
The results show that there was a significant doseresponse relationship in the association between schizophrenia risk and errors on the hinting task, patients having the highest risk, and first-degree relatives having intermediate values. Controlling for age, sex and educational level did not reduce Theory of mind in patients and their relatives the association. Adjusting for IQ and neuropsychological factors reduced the association by small amounts. Failure on the false-belief task was also positively associated with schizophrenia risk, but not significantly so.
The current effect sizes may even underestimate the true extent of the changes in theory of mind in patients and relatives, because the groups were matched on educational level with the control group. As the onset of schizophrenia may interfere with an educational career, individuals fall short of their educational potential, so that adjusting for educational level may lead to an underestimation of the size of the group differences. A modest version of the matching fallacy effect has been reported in non-psychotic relatives (44) .
In the present study, many patients performed well on the first-order false-belief task, which suggests that this task was less sensitive in detecting theory of mind impairments in schizophrenia. In the study by Frith and Corcoran (5), performance was impaired on both first and second-order falsebelief task but other studies have indicated that alterations in theory of mind in schizophrenia are more pronounced on second-order tasks, in which a character has a false belief about the belief of another character (27) . Second-order tasks involve more sophisticated theory of mind skills than those of first order. It is thus possible that significant deficits on false-belief tasks would have been apparent in the current study, if we had used a second-order task. Yet, because of the higher information processing demands posed by this type of false-belief tasks, performance will be partly determined by general cognitive abilities. Indeed, in the study by Doody et al. (45) learningdisabled individuals performed worse than normal controls on a second-order task, indicating that IQ does influence performance. The individuals with schizophrenia nonetheless performed markedly worse compared with the mild learning disabilities group and with the affective disorder group, suggesting a degree of specificity of poor theory of mind performance to schizophrenia that cannot be explained by the effect of IQ alone.
A limitation of the current investigation is that we used verbal theory of mind tasks only. Although severe deficits of verbal comprehension would have limited performance on each of the cognitive tests, as they all depend on the correct understanding of verbal instructions, comprehension skills may be particularly relevant for tasks that consists of short stories. Yet, other studies have found that theory of mind deficits in patients with schizophrenia are independent of the pictorial or verbal form of the mode of answering (46, 47) , which argues against the possibility that our findings can be ascribed to the verbal nature of the tasks that we used. The results of Sarfati et al. (46, 47) suggested that tasks testing the theory of mind with and without verbal material result in comparable conclusions. Differences between both conditions, if present, were slight and consistently pointed to better performance in the verbal than in the pictorial condition. This argues against the possibility that our findings can be ascribed to the verbal nature of the tasks that we used.
Previous studies have suggested that theory of mind deficit is a state-dependent deficit that fluctuates with symptoms (4, 5, 47) . However, the present findings concur with data presented by Wykes et al. (6) that non-psychotic relatives of patients with schizophrenia show subtle changes of theory of mind, suggesting that the theory of mind deficit is at least in part trait-related. In line with this, alterations in theory of mind in patients and relatives were apparently not mediated by the presence of symptoms or schizotypal features. The fact that the association between schizophrenia liability and alterations in theory of mind was independent of (subclinical) psychopathology gives further support to the notion that changes in theory of mind can be considered trait markers for schizophrenia or endophenotypes (48) . Yet, all individuals with schizophrenia who participated in the current study were in remission or partial remission with a low level of symptoms. It is possible that impairments in theory of mind become more severe with increasing levels of symptoms. Indeed, a recent study showed that deficits of theory of mind that were present during the acute phase had disappeared during recovery (49) . Together with the present findings, this may imply that subtle deficits of theory of mind that are part of the vulnerability for the disorder become more severe with increasing levels of symptoms. This would mean that alterations in theory of mind can be considered a mediating vulnerability indicator (50) . Group (controls, relatives and patients) was used as a linear variable of continuous schizophrenia liability. By doing so, it was assumed that the difference between 0 (controls) and 1 (relatives) is the same as the difference between 1 and 2 (cases). While there is no formal way of assessing whether this assumption is correct, testing linear hypotheses of schizophrenia risk using relatives of patients has nevertheless been proven a useful and statistically powerful way to identify traits that may be markers of familial risk (20, 51, 52) . The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that alterations in theory of mind in schizophrenia reflect, at least in part, factors associated with the disorder's genetic basis or shared environmental effects. Although the number of schizophrenia genes is unknown, most researchers agree that it is the sum of a number of genes and environmental factors that lead to the disorder (53, 54) . If this is true, then it is likely that there is a graded disposition to the disorder, such that the probability of developing schizophrenia, or showing related neuropsychological impairments, increases as the degree of predisposition increases (55) . As first-degree relatives of patients with schizophrenia presumably carry a greater genetic risk for the disorder than the general population, our finding of alterations in theory in mind in relatives is consistent with the multifactorial model.
General cognitive ability and neuropsychological measures of memory, attention, verbal fluency and executive functions seemed to mediate only part of the association between theory of mind and schizophrenia risk. The finding that theory of mind deficit is independent from executive functions is not in line with some previous studies. For example, executive functions were related to theory of mind abilities in both healthy and hardto-manage children (23, 56) and in children with autism (21) . It has even been argued that executive functions and theory of mind are cognitively dependent skills. Particularly, it has been suggested that executive functions allow for the development of theory of mind and that executive deficits result in a secondary deficit in the ability to exert control over one's own mental states (24, 56, 57) . However, this has been questioned by the publication of several case reports of double dissociations between both functions (58, 59) . Executive functions comprise several cognitive skills. Specific skills, such as the ability to draw inferences from narratives are most likely involved in theory of mind (60) .
According to our findings, susceptibility to interference, a different aspect of executive functions, seems to be of minor importance to theory of mind.
